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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2306 
 ___________ 
 
 KATHLEEN BROWN 
 
 v. 
 
 BENJAMIN WILTBANK, II, Husband; JUANITA WILTBANK, Wife;  
 CLAUDIA WILTBANK-JOHNSON; HOMEOWNERS LOAN CORP.,  
 a Delaware Corporation; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION  
 SYSTEMS INC., a Delaware Corporation 
 
                                 Ms. Claudia Wiltbank-Johnson, 
 
                                                          Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-00617) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant  
 to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 23, 2012 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: September 18, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Claudia Wiltbank-Johnson, who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals 
orders remanding her case to the Delaware Court of Chancery and denying her 
subsequent motion for reconsideration.   
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not lay out the history of this 
case at great length; suffice it to say, it appears to arise from a dispute over a parcel of 
real estate in Lewes, Delaware.
1
  This federal proceeding began on July 12, 2011, when 
Wiltbank-Johnson filed a “Notice of Removal” in the United States District Court.  In 
this confusing document, Wiltbank-Johnson accused the Delaware courts and their 
officers (as well as the counterparties in the property dispute) of corruption and racism, 
invoking both unspecified “federal questions” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and, 
separately, the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).  The District Court sua 
sponte remanded the case because Wiltbank-Johnson’s notice of removal was 
procedurally defective.  Following the denial of a timely filed motion for reconsideration, 
Wiltbank-Johnson appealed.  We summarily vacated and remanded, holding that the 
District Court had exceeded its statutory authority when it remanded sua sponte based on 
a procedural defect, but stressing that we were “not preclud[ing] the District Court from 
                                                 
1
 See Brown v. Wiltbank, No. 2170, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 214 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2010), 
master’s report adopted by 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011).  
Wiltbank-Johnson has previously filed a writ of prohibition in this Court, requesting that 
we compel the Court of Chancery to dismiss the state action.  We dismissed that request 
for lack of jurisdiction.  See In re Wiltbank-Johnson, 442 F. App’x 649, 650 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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considering whether it ha[d] subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action.”  Brown 
v. Wiltbank, C.A. No. 11-4042 (order entered Dec. 22, 2011).  On remand, the District 
Court concluded that 1) removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 was improper because the case 
could not have been filed originally in federal court, and 2) removal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1443(1) was defective because Wiltbank-Johnson had not satisfied the standard for 
removal under that section.  Thus, the case was again returned to the Delaware Court of 
Chancery.  Wiltbank-Johnson’s motion for reconsideration was denied, after which she 
filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 Our ability to review a remand order is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which 
generally deprives us of jurisdiction over “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court 
from which it was removed,” except when “it was removed pursuant to [28 U.S.C. 
§] 1442 or [28 U.S.C. §] 1443.”  Thus, to the extent that the District Court found removal 
lacking under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, we do not have jurisdiction to review its conclusion.  
See Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 126–28 (3d Cir. 1998); Davis 
v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1997).  To the extent that removal was 
attempted pursuant to § 1443(1), however, we have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s order de novo.  Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 We detect no error in the District Court’s § 1443 analysis.  Wiltbank-Johnson’s 
removal notice did not clearly demonstrate that 1) she was being deprived of rights 
guaranteed by federal law providing for equal civil rights and that 2) she could not 
enforce her rights in state court.  Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047 (quoting State of Georgia v. 
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Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966)).  Furthermore, we see no sign that the District Court 
abused its discretion in denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration.  See Long v. 
Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 (3d Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, finding no 
substantial question to be presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
  
